Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
Arab League Initiative Q and A
1. What is the Arab League Initiative?
2. How does the Saudi Plan compare with the Geneva Accord, the Clinton Parameters and other previous peace accords?
3. Why did the Saudis revive the plan at the Arab League Summit in March 2007? What role does Iran play in the timing of its revival?
4. Is the plan offered as a starting point for negotiations, or a take-it-or-leave-it, "as is" offer?
5. What are the benefits of the Initiative for Israel? For Palestinians? For the Arab world?
6. How have the governments of Israel and the US responded to the resurfaced Initiative? How have the Israeli and Palestinian people responded?
7. What are the problems for Israel around the "refugee" issue in the document, and how might they be addressed?
8. How does the plan affect Israel's relationship with Iran?
9. What role could the US play to restart final status negotiations on the basis of the plan?
1. What is the Arab League Initiative?
The Arab League (Saudi) Peace Initiative, originally proposed in 2002 and endorsed by the Arab League at its March 2003 meeting in Beirut, was again unanimously adopted in March 2007 at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The initiative provides a framework for peace in the region with an explicit focus on land-for-peace. All Arab states would "affirm" that they "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended," and establish normal diplomatic relations, including recognition of Israel's right to exist and live within secure borders, when Israel affirms "full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967" (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights), the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, and "a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194."
2. How does the Saudi Plan compare with the Geneva Accord, Clinton Parameters, and other previous peace accords?
Each of these contain the land-for-peace formula at their core.
In the wake of the failure of the 2000 Camp David negotiations, President Clinton presented both sides with a memo in which he summed up his understanding of the basic requirements of any final resolution of the conflict. The contents of this memo have come to be known as "The Clinton Parameters." President Clinton made clear that what he referred to as his "ideas" were meant only as guidelines for continued negotiation by the parties. These were fleshed out and used to arrive at an official draft proposal for a peace agreement in Taba, Egypt in January 2001. During the Taba talks, negotiators believed themselves to be mere weeks from a true resolution of the conflict.
When President Clinton left office and then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak lost his subsequent re-election bid immediately on the heels of the Taba meetings, the tentative agreement fell off the political horizon. The Bush Administration stated that President Clinton's ideas were "no longer a US proposal," and the newly formed Sharon government announced that the results of the negotiations at Taba "are not binding on the new government." Violence broke out again within months. The Taba Agreement did serve as the basis for the Geneva Accord, an unofficial draft agreement achieved between prominent Israelis and Palestinians. The negotiations were led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and PLO Executive Committee member Yasser Abed Rabbo. The Geneva Accord is much more detailed than either the Clinton Parameters or the Taba Agreement. It deals with many areas that neither of the earlier efforts were able to successfully approach.
All of the agreements reached heretofore share the following elements: The notion of a two-state solution, with a Palestinian state established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("return to the June 4, 1967 borders"), the notion of a shared Jerusalem, and a mutually acceptable resolution of the refugee issue. Each also envisions negotiations over mutually acceptable, minor land swaps in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
3. Why did the Saudis revive the plan at the Arab League Summit in March 2007? What role does Iran play in the timing of its revival?
The initiative was raised again in the Arab world after the Saudi government successfully brokered a Palestinian unity government between Hamas and Fatah. The two events were linked to the desperate need to bring a halt to Palestinian factional fighting and end the devastating international blockade of the Palestinian territories that followed the election of Hamas in January 2006.
It is likely that the Saudis and other Arab states are also concerned about growing unrest across the Middle East, rising extremism among Islamist militants, and a shared concern that the US will not address these issues in a serious and sustained fashion. The war in Iraq has led to an ingathering of extremist groups in that country, some of which are fueled in part by the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The Arab governments are concerned with general unrest and the potential threat to their power should such extremists leave Iraq and turn their attention to the Arab world's failure to deal with the plight of the Palestinians.
It's also useful in this context to remember the on-again, off-again tensions between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'ite Iran. Both countries are administered by narrow, sectarian interpretations of Islamic law, and are thus often divided over issues of theology. Both also harbor dreams (and, in Iran's case, a history) of grand regional leadership. It is possible, then, to see the Arab Initiative as a response to these tensions and an effort to wrest the Israeli-Palestinian conflict away from growing Iranian influence at a time when Tehran is funneling support to both the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Sunni Hamas in Gaza.
In analyzing the decision to revive the Initiative, however, it is important not to allow this factor to overshadow the significance of other issues such as Palestinian internecine violence and the collapse of Iraq. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Iran are also key players in terms of oil and have cooperated more than once over issues of shared concern. In fact, the Iranian President visited Riyadh days before the Arab Initiative was officially re-introduced. Finally, the Arab League Peace Initiative enjoys the backing of all 22 members of the Arab League, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and should not be seen as the work solely of Saudi Arabia.
4. Is the plan offered as a starting point for negotiations or a take-it-or-leave-it, "as is" offer?
None of the Arab leaders supporting the initiative have suggested that its provisions are to serve as preconditions beyond which they will be unable to move. On the contrary, many press reports have stressed the notion of the initiative as a starting point, an effort to get negotiations started. Moreover, both the Saudi Foreign Minister and Arab League Secretary General have stated explicitly that once Israel accepts the initiative "in principle," its clauses are open to negotiation.
Furthermore, it is clear from past experience that no Arab country is likely to suggest that it can negotiate for the Palestinians in their stead. Thus, the initiative cannot serve as a final offer under any conditions. It can, however, allow the Arab states to step in as mediators, an idea that would have been unimaginable for most of Israel's history.
5. What are the benefits of the Initiative for Israel? For Palestinians? For the Arab world?
The Israeli newspaper of record HaAretz editorialized in response to the revived peace plan that "it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Arab initiative and the direct Arab appeal to Israel." The editorial points out that for the first time in history, the Arab states "have adopted a comprehensive approach that confronts regional interests and is prepared to adopt Israel as part of the solution, not just as part of the problem." The fact that this approach has been maintained since the initiative was first broached in 2002, in spite of the war in Lebanon and continuing violence between Israel and the Palestinians, should be seen as an indication of the depth of Arab commitment to a land-for-peace solution to the conflict.
This should not, however, be seen as an open-ended opportunity. The time to move is now, before the rising tide of extremism forces the hands of leaders who would rather accommodate Israel, and before the upheaval generated by the Iraq war, tensions with Iran, or ongoing Israeli-Palestinian fighting create a new reality in which those who support the plan now will no longer be free, or willing, to treat Israel as a full partner.
Yossi Alpher, a former senior adviser to Prime Minister Barak and former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, has said that this is such an important moment that he would like to see the international community step in to "take the initiative and set the scene for future progress by convening the relevant parties.... The Saudis," he writes, "have issued a challenge that must not be ignored."
By moving into a negotiation process that would normalize relations with all its neighbors, Israel would finally be able to live in peace and security It is impossible to guess what the social impact might be of finally being able to raise a generation of native-born Israelis without fear.
For Palestinians, the Arab Initiative provides both the support necessary to reach a peace deal that will necessarily entail painful compromises on land and refugee settlement. It will also serve to subsume internal Palestinian political struggles in a larger Arab framework. If accepted and successful, the Initiative would necessarily improve life beyond measure for the Palestinian people.
For the broader Arab world, peace with Israel would contribute greatly to stabilizing the region as a whole, permit Arab countries to work more closely with the US, empower moderates and strengthen the hand of those who would replace violence with diplomatic negotiation, such as in Iraq. It will furthermore remove the issue of the Palestinian people and its emotional resonance from the agenda of the Arab people in general and extremists in particular.
6. How have the governments of Israel and the US responded to the resurfaced Initiative? How have the Israeli and Palestinian people responded?
Both Israel and the US have largely discounted the Arab Initiative, at best suggesting that it contains "positive elements." Neither government has focused on the various powerful elements contained in the proposal such as the explicit and implicit inclusion of Israel in regional politics, the willingness to fully normalize relations with the Jewish State and "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over," and the understanding that the solution to the refugee problem must be "agreed upon" by all sides. Both governments have found reasons to take issue and have failed to acknowledge that all such proposals can only serve as starting points, with diplomacy and dialogue serving to bridge the gaps that inevitably exist when two long-time enemies sit down to talk.
Although the Israeli response seemed promising at first, little has been done to take advantage of this new opportunity. The day after the Saudi summit, Prime Minister Olmert stated at a press conference that he wanted to "invite to a meeting all Arab heads of state, including, of course, the king of Saudi Arabia, whom I regard as an important leader, in order to engage in dialogue." He added that the sides would bring their own demands, and neither would dictate terms. Arabs leaders recognized the statement as an effort to avoid dealing directly with the Arab Initiative. Indeed, a diplomat close to the Israeli deliberations who spoke anonymously to the press reported that Olmert was "making an alternative proposal [to hold a regional conference] because he knows it won't happen. He is sidestepping the issue."
Possibly the most striking fact about the official reticence to engage in any serious way with the Arab Initiative is that it comes in such clear opposition to the desires of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. A poll conducted in March 2007 indicated that more than half of Israelis want to see their government engage in negotiations with the current Palestinian unity government, or at least the moderate Fatah members of that government. Polls conducted in September 2006 demonstrated that fully 74% of Palestinians favored negotiations. In both cases, it was clear that any such negotiations would be based on the principle of land-for-peace.
7. What are the problems for Israel around the "refugee" issue in the document, and how might they be addressed?
The Arab Initiative calls for the "achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194."
The Arab initiative makes no mention of a Palestinian "right of return," but rather states that a solution should be "agreed upon," in accordance with UN Resolution 194. The phrase "agreed upon" by definition means that a solution cannot be imposed by one side, and Israel has made it clear that it would not agree to a solution that involved the implementation of massive Palestinian return to what is now Israel.
Moreover, Israel's existence and establishment as a "Jewish" state is grounded in international law, namely UN Resolution 181 which called specifically for the establishment of a Jewish state alongside an Arab state in historical Palestine. Furthermore, the PLO implicitly accepted this Jewish nature of Israel when it issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988, based on resolution 181.
Indeed, a 2003 survey of Palestinian refugees found that only 10% would want to return to their previous homes in what is now Israel. In addition, a September 2006 survey found that 66% of Palestinians favor a two-state solution that recognizes Israel as the state "for the Jewish people," in return for Israel recognizing Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.
Just before the summit at which the Saudis revived the initiative, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert was quoted as saying that "Israel will never accept Resolution 194, and this constitutes a red line for us. But anything over this red line, including creative solutions to the refugees [problem], which does not include their settlement in Israel, is open for discussion." The day after the summit, Olmert told the Jerusalem Post that he will "never accept a solution that is based on their return to Israel, any number."
On the other hand, many Palestinians -- decision-makers, community leaders, poll takers -- have said clearly that the refugee question is among the most critical for their people. The loss of home remains at the heart of the Palestinian national narrative, a source of great communal and individual anguish. Israel's out-of-hand rejection of UN Resolution 194 is generally interpreted by many Palestinians as a refusal to deal honestly with the refugees or to acknowledge Israel's role in creating the problem.
Several solutions to this impasse have been suggested, however, all of which involve a creative combination of compensation, settlement in host countries, settlement in the newly established state of Palestine, and the return of limited numbers of refugees to Israel proper.
Surveys, the history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and independent analysis all point to a real flexibility on the part of the Palestinians regarding the issue of an actual return of refugees to what is now Israel -- as long as the issue is settled as part of a final settlement creating an independent Palestinian state, and Israel acknowledges its part in the creation of the refugee problem. Such an acknowledgment is not on Israel's agenda. Yet, if a diplomatic approach is found for the other outstanding problems, it is widely believed that this too could be resolved.
Clearly, the Palestinian refugee problem will have to be addresssed as part of a final status agreement. Some aspects of the question (numbers, levels of compensation, who deserves refugee status, etc.) can only be settled at the negotiating table. An attempt to settle these issues ahead of negotiation to the liking of one party or the other will serve only to delay any reasonable solution.
8. How does the plan affect Israel's relationship with Iran?
Israel's relationship with Iran (not an Arab country, and thus not a member of the Arab League) has traditionally been far more complex than the pronouncements of the current Iranian President would suggest.
Indeed, many in Tehran's ruling elite have attempted to distance themselves from President Ahmadinejad's virulently anti-Semitic statements. Though Iran's political scene is framed by theological concerns and a narrow reading of Islamic law, it's important to remember that it is one of the few countries in the Middle East with a representative system of government. Iranians choose their representatives in regular elections.
The Arab Initiative would not have a direct impact on Israel's relationship with Tehran, but would in effect reclaim the Palestinian problem for the Arab nations, taking back the lead that Iran has tried to take through its support for Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel and earlier.
The vast majority of Palestinians have indicated their interest in the democratic process, and are moreover Sunni Muslims -- meaning that a Shiite representative theocracy such as that in place in Iran holds little appeal. Should their fellow Arab Sunnis lead an effort to resolve the conflict with Israel, the Palestinian people are far more likely to want to follow that lead than to cozy up to Tehran. This would effectively remove much of the threat that Iran might hold for Israel.
9. What role could the US play to restart final status negotiations on the basis of the plan?
As the sole remaining superpower, the US holds the key to movement on any aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated openly and plainly, for instance, that Israel would not engage in diplomacy with the Syrians, despite Syrian overtures for negotiations, because the Bush Administration did not want Israel to do so.
Moreover, the US government holds both the international purse strings and access to international legitimacy sought by struggling nations around the world. If the US does not put its full weight behind any efforts at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the status quo will continue to hold sway.
On the other hand, if a high-level envoy -- with the full, public support of the White House -- were to be dispatched to engage in serious diplomacy, establish clear parameters and internationally-back mechanisms of accountability, the two sides would have both the incentive to come back to the table and the political cover to make difficult compromises.
References:
The Clinton Parameters and Taba Agreement